An economic research agenda for valuing the ORWRP wetlands by Tenwalde, Tracy J. & Hitzhusen, Fred J.
Economic Valuation of N Abatement ♦  173
Introduction
Numerous studies have attempted to measure the 
diverse benefits of wetlands through various economic 
measures (Bergstrom et al., 2001; Van den Bergh, 2001; 
Costanza et al., 1997).  Few, however, have specifically 
looked at wetlands  ̓economic nitrogen abatement function 
(Gren, 1994; Gren et al., 1995).  Once viewed as a “waste 
of valuable land, that could only be improved through 
drainage and destruction,” wetlands are now considered to 
be multifunctional ecosystems that provide protection from 
phenomena including climate change, noise pollution and 
nonpoint source pollution runoff (Mitsch and Gosselink, 
2000).  Woodward and Wui (2001) attempted to examine 
relative values of various wetland services through a 
metaanalysis of 39 replacement cost and contingent 
valuation wetland studies.  Ten attributes were evaluated, 
and although abatment of nitrogen pollution was not 
specifically mentioned, the variable “quality” included 
recharge of groundwater, water control and retention, and 
the removal and transformation of nutrients.  Their upper 
bound of $1,378 per acre of wetland with a 90% CF for 
Quality ranked fifth behind commercial fishing ($5,618), 
storm protection ($5,142), bird watching ($2,782), quantity 
of water available ($2,571) and flood control ($1,747), 
finishing just ahead of recreational fishing ($1,342).
This is an important discovery.  As Turner et al. (2003b) 
point out, the ability to value natureʼs services is constrained 
by the complexity of nature itself.  So many of a wetlandʼs 
benefits accrue unknowingly to society at large, or to 
individuals other than the wetland owners.  Thus, private 
owners tend to omit these social costs in their bid rent 
function of the land, finding it much more profitable to 
convert the wetland to other uses, at a large cost to society 
(ERS, 1998).  The many stakeholders who have competing 
interests in wetlands often fail to fully account for the values 
of the jointly produced wetland products.  The stakeholderʼs 
self-serving interests result in them looking at their own 
benefit stream, while failing to observe the wetlands Total 
Economic Value (Turner, 2000).
A case in point involves the nitrogen cycle within the 
wetland (Crumpton and Phipps, 1994; Nikolaidis et al., 
1998, Mitsch and Gosselink, 2000).  We know that wetlands 
have both inflows and outflows of chemicals from the 
water and the air, but it is the services not observed during 
these flows that are significant.  Chemical interactions, 
such as decomposition, mineralization, humification, 
immobilization, nitrification and denitrification all take 
place within wetlands, all encompass important elements 
of wetland function, and all are difficult to estimate 
economically.  Bystom et al. (2000) suggest that wetlands 
are not being optimally utilized for their pollution sink 
function.  Economically speaking, the marginal value 
product of wetlands  ̓nitrogen abatement function has been 
neglected in the economic literature, which has led to an 
inefficient allocation of wetlands or an overabundance of 
spillover effects for which wetlands will be considered as 
an alternative nitrogen control strategy (Bystrom, 2000a).
A good first step toward resolution of this valuation 
dilemma can be made in the context of an experiment 
examining effects of hydrologic pulsing at the Olentangy 
River Wetland Research Park (ORWRP).  With pumped 
river water containing a significant concentration of 
nitrate-nitrogen from agricultural run-off, the experimental 
wetlands can be manipulated with pulsed and nonpulsed 
fluxes of this nutrient-laden water  (Mitsch et al., 2002). 
The controlled hydrologic experiments can be executed so 
that each service the wetland provides can be evaluated 
and measured.  However we are still faced with the task 
of developing a model to estimate the economic values of 
the services a wetland provides.  To begin we must look 
at the difficulties others have faced.  Turner et al. (2003a), 
Shortle and Horan (2002), Turner et al. (2003b) and Gren 
(1995) attempt to categorize those difficulties.
The Economic Research Design
Despite difficulties in measuring wetlands  ̓ nitrogen 
abatement function, we know the pulsing experiments have 
revealed many things about wetlands.  Nitrogen, in essence, 
is necessary for the proper growth of all living things. 
However, an abundance of the chemical causes increased 
water pollution and water treatment costs (Mitsch and 
Spieles, 2000), eutrophication of waterways and estuaries 
(Gren, 2005; Mitsch et al., 2001), and increased and uncertain 
health risks for plants, animals and humans (Wilson et al., 
1999; Gallagher and Smith, 1985).
Nitrogen pollution occurs from many sources, two of 
which are categorized for discharge regulation as point 
sources, regulated by CWA (PL 92-500), USEPA, and 
non-point sources, which are regulated by states, WQA of 
1987, sec. 319.  These nonpoint sources include runoff from 
agricultural crops, livestock, and urban areas; direct transport 
to groundwater by leaching; and atmospheric deposition. 
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This relationship between nitrogen and the environment is 
classified economically as a negative externality, or simply 
the transmission beyond the recognized legal boundary of the 
producer of some quantity of matter that gives rise to costs 
for others (Desgupta and Pearce, 1979).  These effects are 
called externalities precisely because the impact on others 
are external to the unit that makes the decisions about the 
resourceʼs allocation (Bromley, 1997).  Hitzhusen (2001) 
depicts the externality with familiar supply and demand 
curves, where price is on the vertical axis and the joint 
production of goods and bads along the horizontal axis 
(Figure 1).
Currently, the cost of nitrogen pollution is borne by 
society, meaning all of us pay in some way through reduced 
water quality, health risks, and degradation of natural areas 
and waterways for future generations.  Both agricultural 
best management practices (BMPs) and economic policy 
mechanisms have been created in an attempt to combat this 
externality.  Horan and Shortle (2001) analyze the effects of 
the economic policy mechanisms for the control of nonpoint 
source nitrogen pollution.  Their analysis includes taxes and 
subsidies, which include charges on purchases of nitrogen 
fertilizer, governmental standards, which places restrictions 
on nitrogen applications and their timing, regulations on 
applications in excess of crop needs, mandatory pollution 
controls, markets, such as nitrogen trading programs, 
changes in property rights, contracts and bonds, such as 
land retirement and conservation contracts, conservation 
and wetland reserve programs, incentives to uise BMPs 
and precision farming, and liability measures which use 
strict liability and negligence.  Doering et al. (1999) also 
present a thorough analysis of the drivers that seemed most 
responsible for meeting a nitrogen loss pollution constraint, 
and present both benefits and costs from the consideration of 
many different stakeholders, including nitrogen producers, 
users, emitters, and victims using the EPIC model.
Although neither study found one specific strategy that 
outperformed any of the others, Horan and Shortle (2001) 
make some very revealing statements in their analysis.  Under 
their framework there are three broad questions economists 
must be concerned with before seeking a nitrogen pollution 
control instrument: who to target, what pollution compliance 
measures should be used, and how best to induce changes. 
They state that analysts should focus only on those most likely 
to emit nitrogen; which would be the large number of small 
contributors (farmers), and that environmental solutions are 
Figure 1 (Hitzhusen, 2001).  D = marginal benefit to farmers, S= marginal private costs of farmers, Sʼ = marginal social 
costs, Q = joint output (goods and bads), E = equilibrium before cost internalization, Eʼ new equilibrium after tax or 
regulatory standard, Pʼ = new price, PʼEʼC = consumer surplus, PʼEʼB = producer Surplus, EEʼE* = Dead Weight Loss 
and a Potential Pareto Improvement exists = if NMB > NMC ≈ E*EʼE + PʼEʼC + PʼEʼB > PEC + PEA.  E* and P* can be 
considered as the surplus chemicals and soil erosion which imposes costs on downstream users, and EʼQʼ could be 
considered a critical threshold; any production of bads over this equilibrium would exceed environmental assimilative 
capacities. As production moves from Q to Qʼ due to a reduction in production, the excess costs are internalized, meaning 
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most optimal.  They also found that a second-best tax for 
a pollution-decreasing input will be positive if an increase 
in the use of the input is associated with increased demand 
for the use of the pollution-increasing input, resulting in 
increased environmental consequences.  
The Topic 6 Report came to this same conclusion, 
echoing Shortle and Horan, in that a mixed policy using 
several different nitrogen control strategies may be the 
most cost-effective approach when there is a great deal of 
variation in the physical, ecological and economic conditions 
present.  This reinforces the concept of using wetlands as 
a nitrogen pollution decreasing input.  It now becomes a 
question of property rights, a safe minimum standard and 
economic models.
Property Rights
To discuss property rights, we must first begin with 
the Coase Theorem and the theory behind property rights. 
Land ownership consists of a “bundle of rights.” (Heimlich, 
1998)  These rights are well protected by governments 
except in matters of eminent domain and public safety 
in which governments can take property for public use 
with compensation or to prevent harm to others by actions 
occurring on the land.  
The Coase Theorem states that when property rights are 
implicitly assigned to the producers of the bads (emissions), 
or in our case the farmers, and if there is no regulation over 
the externality producing activity (nitrogen applications), 
the emitters (farmers) will drive the marginal benefit of 
the “free” nitrogen emission to zero.  The producers of 
these emissions are allowed to dispose of their wastes for 
free, causing society and the environment to either pay for 
cleaning or to pay the producers to pollute less.
However, when property rights are implicitly assigned to 
the consumers, or to the users of water downstream, a high 
amount of regulation of the externality producing activity 
will exist.  Simply stated, consumers have the right to clean 
water.  The producers of these emissions would then have 
to pay the group who owns the property right an amount 
equal to the damage they will cause by emitting.  Coase 
stated that in the absence of government (or standards), 
both consumers and producers should take averting action 
(private bargaining) to maximize the value of the spillover 
to both receivers and producers of the externality.  However, 
Coase was referring to one producer and one receiver. 
Zeckhauser and Fisher (1995) generalize this outcome to 
the case of non-point source pollution where there are many 
producers and consumers.
Without well-defined property rights that are: 
comprehensively assigned, exclusive, transferable and 
secure; incomplete markets exist.  With incomplete markets, 
no incentive exists to change from the status quo.  The 
inability or unwillingness of governments to assign property 
rights to cover each and every environmental transaction or 
contingency, will not allow resources, such as wetlands, to 
move to their highest valued use.  The four types of property 
rights discussed in the literature include: State, Private, 
Common and Open Access. (Bromely, 1997)
Economics flows from the assignment of these property 
rights.  Without property rights, there can be no benefit 
stream and thus no measurable benefits to value.  The same 
is true for wetlands.  As we stated previously, without well-
defined and well-assigned property rights, natural resources 
fail to move to their highest-value use.  Presently, nitrogen 
emissions place a cost on society from the market failure 
of an externality steming from an incorrectly assigned 
property right.  By changing the familiar property regime for 
environmental resources from a private to a more common 
property regime, entitlements over the distribution of net 
economic surplus would accrue to a more inclusive group 
of stakeholders.  The value of the benefit stream will rise, 
in turn causing the value of wetland services to rise.
Methods
But, how do we value these services through an economic 
market?  The methods that exist to value wetland functions 
are too numerous to mention here, but a meta-analysis, a 
replacement cost analysis, an uncertainty analysis through 
a regulatory constraint or safe minimum standard, and 
existing market and nonmarket values were all considered. 
The methods that were ultimately selected to value the 
Olentangy River Wetland Research Park wetlands nitrogen 
abatement function consist of:  (1) developing a benefit-cost 
analysis framework to analyze strategies in estimating a 
value as a marginal reduction in nitrogen emissions; (2) 
measureing the increase in treatment costs of the City of 
Columbus, Division of Water, water treatment plant after a 
N advisory and then yearly in anticipation and prevention 
of a N advisory using existing market data; (3) performing 
an Aversive Behavior/Defensive Measure analysis through 
a Columbus, Ohio household consumption function that 
will examine the changes in purchases of bulk packaged 
water sales data as a measure of willingness to pay, and (4) 
developing a framework analysis for the wetlands value in 
decreasing the risk and uncertainty of a wetland as a nitrogen 
pollution control policy.  Through these methods, we will 
attempt to place an economic lower-bound value on the 
ORWRPʼs two, 1-acre experimental wetlands.
The Models
Model 1
Our first model develops a benefit-cost analysis 
framework to analyze strategies in estimating an economic 
value as a marginal reduction in nitrogen emissions.  This 
first model consists of a Benefit-Cost Analysis or the Net 
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where, Y = income, T = time, K = initial capital outlay, 
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r = discount rate (see Hitzhusen and Gutrich, 2004), s = 
strategy, I = categories of benefits and costs associated the 
alternative nitrogen control strategies, B = annual benefits 
of alternative nitrogen control strategies, and O = annual 
costs of alternative nitrogen control strategies.  
These alternative nitrogen control strategies include 
utilizing wetlands, increased water testing, bottled water 
purchases, installation of treatment equipment; both 
residentially and municipally, finding a new water source, 
tolerating it, or moving away. (Bayoh et al., 2002)  Estimation 
of the private and social costs through a benefit-cost analysis 
of the nitrogen control strategies will allow the researcher to 
conceptualize the impact of the nitrogen nonpoint sources 
pollution problem and allow a more controllable undertaking 
of the impacts and issues involved.
Model 2
Our second model evolved from our discussions with the 
City of Columbus, Division of Waterʼs Quality Assurance 
Lab at the Dublin Road Water Treatment Plant and the 
Plant s̓ Operations Manager.  We were able to obtain nitrogen 
data on their monthly “finished water” samples for their 
nitrogen maximums for the years spanning 1983 to 2003; 
historical data from the labs database of USGS testing data 
for 6 field stations along the Scioto River from the Hoskins 
Road testing station, Lat. 40.4194, Long. -83.09685, to the 
raw water intake to the Dublin Road Water Treatment Plant. 
We were also able to acquire cost data from 2001 to the 
present, for dollar value per million gallons of High Service 
or Finished Water and dollar value per million gallons of 
Low Service or Raw Water.
We plan to measure the increases in treatment costs of the 
City of Columbus, Division of Water, Water Treatment Plant 
after a nitrogen advisory and then yearly in anticipation and 
prevention of a nitrogen advisory, from 2000 to our modeled 
year 2002.  We will use a cost function and measure the 
increase in costs during the time periods when a nitrogen 
spike would be most likely to occur.
Model 3
The NOAA Topic 6 Report (Doering, 1999) states two 
ways to utilize economic market data in the valuation of 
ecological functions provided by wetlands.  They are the 
replacement cost method and the avoided cost method. 
The replacement cost method seeks to price the service in 
equivalent man-made services, such as nutrient filtering. 
(Breaux, et al, 1995, Bystrom, 2000, Gren 1995)  The 
avoided-cost method seeks to find a value of the service by 
using the value of items purchased so as to keep their same 
level of utility and avoid the damages from the pollution 
they would knowledgeably be exposed to.  
Our third model seeks to perform an Aversive Behavior/
Defensive Measure analysis.  Courant and Porter, 1981, 
first examined the relationship between willingness to pay 
for environmental quality and external diseconomies by 
examining the household utility function.  Hartford 1984, 
stated theoretically that the individual maximizes utility 
over cleanliness and a general commodity, trying to assess 
individual risk and their changes in consumption behavior. 
Consider a utility function depicting an individualʼs private 
consumption of a level of cleanliness (or clean water) and 
their normal bundle of goods:
qFXYtsCXUU +== ..),(max
Where U = utility of consumer, X = numeraire basket 
of goods. and C = function of C(F,W) or the level of water 
cleanliness.  This utility function is constrained by a spending 
budget, in which Y = Income, q = q(F,W), which is the 
cost of a pollution episode, F = frequency of the pollution 
episode, and W = ambient level of pollution.  
In the case of the ORWRP wetlands, avoidance cost will 
allow the researcher to analyze and measure this utility 
function through a Columbus, Ohio household consumption 
function.  This will examine the changes in purchases of 
bulk packaged water sales as a measure of willingness to pay 
during the time of a nitrogen advisory or in anticipation of 
a nitrogen advisory.  Our sample of weekly bulk packaged 
water data is drawn from Columbus, Ohio metropolitan 
area stores from a national supermarket chain. Due to data 
constraints we will analyze the year 2002, even though no 
nitrogen advisories were in affect during that time.  We 
will attempt to identify key variables to determine a bulk 
packaged water demand function from the bulk packaged 
water sales data for 2002.  This will allow us to estimate 
a residual willingness to pay for an alternative source of 
drinking water that may be lingering for consumers after 
experiencing a six-week nitrogen advisory occurring in a 
portion of Columbus from June 13, 2000 to July 5, 2000 
where it was unsafe to consume and best to avoid the unsafe 
nitrogen laden water from their tap. (Harford, 1984, Bartik, 
1988, and Abdalla, et al, 1992; EPA, 2000).
Horan and Shortle (2001) state that there are two special 
circumstances where extensive information on demand for, 
and supply of a good are not required. The first is when 
water quality is a perfect substitute for the purchased input 
and the second is when the change in total costs does not 
affect marginal cost and output of the good. “The cost saving 
implies a true measure of the benefits of the change in quality 
(Freeman, 1979b).”  Examples would be the avoided cost 
function of bulk packaged water sales, or a reduction in 
chemicals needed to treat water for drinking as more and 
more nitrogen control strategies (wetlands) are implemented 
strategically throughout a region, respectively.
Model 4
Bystrom et al. (2000) present the concept of nitrogen 
abatement uncertainty into the pollution control constraint, 
PC*.  They address an overall uncertainty of pollution 
abatement capacity and impacts of point source and non-
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φα
point source pollution and their stochastic nature.  Their 
model presents probability as it enters the cost equation. 
This causes the efficient proportion of spending to dispose 
of wastes to not be at its most cost efficient allocation.  The 
use of Waste Water Treatment Plant (WWTP) and wetland 
substitutability becomes questionable and an inefficient 
allocation of wetland and WWTP abatement is attained.
Their model considers a watershed with two sources 
of nitrogen emissions: agricultural or NPS pollution and 
a WWTP or point source pollution.  There are also two 
methods for controlling the nitrogen pollution: construction 
of wetlands and further investment in Waste Water Treatment 
Plant.  The authors use a chance constrained programming 
approach which has been commonly applied for solving 
economic programming problems under uncertainty and 
is useful for illustrating the impact of uncertainty and how 
the variance of emissions affect the optimal solution.  
Their Pollution Constraint formula is as follows:   
∗≤+ PCPVPE LL
2/1)()( αφ
where E(PL) = expected nitrogen load,
                                                 =  variance of total 
nitrogen load, and
    = parameter specifying the weight that should be 
attached to the variance of emissions in order for the 
abatement target or the pollution constraint amount, PC*, 
to be reached with a probability of     . 
Since V(PL) is assumed to follow a normal distribution, 
the value of      is obtained from the standard normal 
cumulative distribution.  If uncertainty of emissions is 
irrelevant to the problem, then φα  is equal to zero or 
the probability of reducing nitrogen emissions solely on 
expected emissions is zero and would have no effect on 
the pollution constraint equation.  Through the pulsing 
experiments at the ORWRP wetlands, we see that uncertainty 
is relevant to the problem of nitrogen emissions.
Breaux et al. (1995) have also examined uncertainty 
while measuring a natural wetland system as a substitute 
for traditional waste water treatment.  Gallagher and Smith 
(1985) initially analyzed uncertainty while attempting to 
measure environmental valuation changes and found that 
the amenities were not certain and if households recognized 
this uncertainty in the amenities they were selecting, the 
conventional approaches to benefit measurement were 
inappropriate.  Turner et al.1(1995) have also viewed 
wetlands as an insurance policy for farmers against any 
liability they may face from causing nitrogen pollution.
This analysis of uncertainty could also lead to an analysis 
of nitrogen control strategies through minimum risk variance 
portfolio theory where nitrogen pollution control instruments 
can be evaluated as portfolios of minimum risk on the 
portfolio possibility set assuming E-V preferences.  
FIgure 2 illustrates the existence of uncertainty for 
residents in Columbus, Ohio for nitrogen nonpoint source 
pollution, indicating that more studies will need to be 
performed before an accurate economic estimate can 
be included as a sub-model and placed in the wetland 
hydrological and biochemical model.  
Results
The empirical results of Models 2 and 3 are presented 
in a recently coumpleted MS thesis at OSU by Tenwalde 
(2004).  In this paper, we have attempted to put forth a 
research agenda for the valuation of nitrogen nonpoint source 
pollution absorbed by the ORWRP.  These economic models 
attempt to estimate the value of the ORWRP wetlands for 
its nitrogen nonpoint pollution abatement function.  Once 
many of these public sector service functions of a wetland 
are realized (Costanza et al., 1997), the analysis of the 
functions of a wetlands becomes more easily done and 
understood. (Doering et al,, 1999)
Conclusions
Our conclusions, thus far, are that the pulsing project 
taking place at the ORWRP is highly relevant to many 
harmful and uncertain problems that ecosystems across 
the globe are facing. Future research done at the ORWRP 
is essential if the knowledge on the reliability of wetlands 
to retain nitrogen from agricultural runoff is desired.  Our 
dependence upon wetlands is becoming more and more clear 
through these experiments.  More patterns of dependence 
will undoubtedly emerge, hopefully before many more 
natural wetlands are lost and anymore mitigated and 
treatment wetlands are built. (Doering et al., 1999, Mitsch 
et al., 2001)
On our attempt at determining a model for valuation of 
the nitrogen abatement function of wetlands, it seems to us 
and others (Zeckhauser and Fisher, 1995; Turner et al., 1995; 
Shortle and Abler, 2001) that any approach to valuation 
should be thought of as an incomplete and uncertain venture. 
Therefore, a determined effort should be directed towards 
different types of procedures for assessing an economic or 
willingness to pay value.
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Figure 2.  Maximum monthly NO3-N in finished water 
from Dublin Road water plant.  Source:  City of 
Columbus, Division of Water, Water Quality Assurance 
Lab.
φα
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